HBM memory for Huawei's AI chips can cost $32,000 per chip, broker in Shenzhen says
Huawei is now telling some customers to source the HBM memory for its AI chips themselves — an arrangement that in practice pushes buyers onto the black market. That is according to The Information, summarized by The Decoder, and the report lands just ahead of Huawei's planned launch of its flagship Ascend 960DT chip early next year. Behind it lies a simple but urgent bottleneck: Chinese suppliers cannot produce enough high-speed memory, and U.S. export rules close the door to the two companies that together control over 80 percent of the global market.
Why memory is the bottleneck
HBM (High-Bandwidth Memory) is the memory stacked right next to — or on top of — an AI chip, and it is critical to how fast large language models can run. According to the report, which The Decoder relays from The Information, Huawei's Chinese suppliers cannot produce enough of this memory. At the same time, U.S. export rules block direct purchases from Samsung and SK Hynix — the two South Korean giants that together account for over 80 percent of the global HBM market.
The result is a structured shortage: demand for Huawei chips exists, the production capacity for the chip itself exists, but a single component — the memory — lacks a legal supply route. It is against this backdrop that Huawei has reportedly asked some customers to find the memory on their own, according to The Information. The consequence, as The Decoder describes it, is that buyers are in practice left to the black market.
How the smuggling scheme works
The method described in the report is both simple and fragile. Smugglers pack HBM memory together with cheap server processors whose performance falls below the export threshold — in other words, chips that can legally be exported. The packages are then shipped to China via Hong Kong. Once they arrive, workshops separate the memory chips from the processors.
The description of the process is brief, but it points to two characteristics: it is error-prone, and the error rate is high. Even so, it pays off, according to the report, because the margins are large enough to compensate for the losses. In other words: even with a significant share of damaged or lost chips along the way, the profit on the memory that actually arrives is high enough to make the business worth the risk for those involved.
How many packages are shipped this way, and what share of Huawei's memory needs is covered by such channels, the report does not say. That is a significant open question, because scale determines whether this is a marginal loophole or a structured part of the supply chain.
The price of one chip: up to $32,000 in memory alone
The most concrete — and most vulnerable — set of figures in the report comes from a broker in Shenzhen. According to this source, quoted by The Information, the price of smuggled HBM3E memory has risen from a few hundred dollars to around $4,000 per unit in just one year.
The arithmetic that follows explains why this is a heavy financial burden for customers: a single Huawei chip needs six to eight such memory units. At prices around $4,000 per unit, the memory alone can cost up to $32,000 per chip — before the cost of the chip itself, assembly, transport and black-market risk are added on.
It is worth stressing what these figures rest on: one unnamed broker in Shenzhen, relayed through The Information and onward through The Decoder. No independent source confirms the price tag, and the market for smuggled HBM is by definition opaque. The figures should be read as an indicative signal from an actor with first-hand knowledge of the market — not as documented market statistics.
South Korea: $560 million in violations — and the year is not half over
Another figure that puts the smuggling story in perspective comes from South Korean authorities, as relayed by The Information: as of May, South Korea's customs service had uncovered trade violations worth $560 million — already above the previous full-year record. One third of that amount involved strategic goods such as chips, exported without proper permission or with false declarations.
This points to two things. First, that smuggling of chips out of South Korea — where both Samsung and SK Hynix produce HBM — is an active and growing business. Second, that the authorities are in fact uncovering some of it, but the fact that the full-year record had already been broken by May in the report's reference year suggests that detected cases make up only part of the total picture.
Ascend 960DT: a promise resting on a supply chain Huawei does not control
Huawei plans to launch the Ascend 960DT early next year, and the company claims — this is a company statement, not independent verification — that the chip will double performance compared with current chips. But the performance promise rests on access to HBM memory, and it is precisely that access the report paints an uneasy picture of.
Stacked together, the story points toward a structural vulnerability: a company that cannot obtain critical memory through legal channels, and that asks customers to find it themselves, is building its next major product on a supply chain exposed to detection, price spikes and chance. If the price of smuggled memory continues to rise, or if customs and export authorities tighten enforcement, it could delay or make the 960DT launch significantly more expensive — no matter how strong the chip is on paper.
It is nevertheless important not to over-conclude: the report does not describe how many customers are affected by the arrangement, what share of Huawei's total needs is covered by such channels, or whether Huawei is simultaneously building alternative, legal supply routes. These questions remain open in the available material.
What is actually documented — and what is not
Everything in this story stems from a single source: The Information, available here only through The Decoder's summary. That means none of the claims can be verified against Huawei's own statements, documents, comments from Samsung or SK Hynix, or U.S. authorities — no such statements exist in the material.
Concretely, this yields the following hierarchy of confidence:
- Stronger footing: South Korea's customs figures ($560 million as of May, above the full-year record, one third strategic goods) are attributed to a public body, even though they are relayed via The Information.
- Intermediate footing: The description of the smuggling method via Hong Kong and packing with sub-threshold processors is detailed, but the source is unknown.
- Weakest footing: The $4,000-per-unit price and the $32,000-per-chip memory cost rest on one unnamed broker in Shenzhen.
For the reader, the conclusion is nevertheless fairly clear, regardless of how precise the figures are: Huawei's AI chip strategy rests on a memory supply the company does not itself control — and which increasingly appears to run through Hong Kong workshops, brokers in Shenzhen and a black market where the price of a single memory chip has risen more than tenfold in one year.
This article is based on The Decoder's report of November 3, 2026, which cites The Information's investigation. The black-market price figures come from a single unnamed source and are not independently confirmed.

